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INDIAN LANDS: FINANCING INDIAN AGRICULTURE:
MORTGAGED INDIAN LANDS AND THE FEDERAL
TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
John Fredericks HI*
Congress' enactment of the General Allotment Act in 1887 marked
the beginning of a new era in federal Indian policy and a dramatic
change in the communal property concepts of Indian tribes.' Under
the Act individual tribal members became owners of parcels of
agricultural and grazing lands on their respective Indian reserva-
tions. Each reservation was divided into allotments with specified
acreage going to each Indian resident. The federal policy expressed
in the General Allotment Act was to end the system of tribal land
ownership by Indians and to substitute private ownership in order
to advance the assimilation of American Indians into white society.
2
In other words, the Indians were to become farmers.
For the most part, the assimilative goals of the General Allot-
ment Act failed, and Indian tribes were able to remain outside
the great American melting pot. Nevertheless, the agricultural goals
behind allotment of tribal lands had its effect on Indian culture.
An agrarian lifestyle was fairly compatible with the culture of the
nomadic hunting and gathering tribes of the West, most of whom
were on reservations by 1887. Moreover, many Indian tribes had
a rich tradition of agriculture long before the first white men came
to the New World. As a result, many Indian people easily em-
braced the agrarian lifestyle after the General Allotment Act. To-
day, farming and ranching is a major enterprise in Indian country,
as fragile as the industry may be.
Section 5 of the General Allotment Act expressly provided that
the allotted lands would be held in trust for the sole use and benefit
of the allottees and their heirs.' The United States Supreme Court
has held that this language creates a limited trust relationship that
does not of itself impose fiduciary management duties on the
United States. Instead, the trust status was intended only to pre-
vent improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assure their
* B.A., 1984, University of Montana; J.D., 1987, University of Colorado. Associate,
Fredericks & Pelcyger, Boulder, Colo. Third Place Award, 1986 American Indian Law
Review Writing Competition. Due to delays in publication, an update of the article, and
the author's graduation, this paper is being published as a lead article.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331 et seq. (1982).
2. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982).
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immunity from state taxation.' Many of the allotments retain this
trust status today.5
It was against the background of the General Allotment Act
that Congress in 1956 enacted section 483a of title 25 of the United
States Code, which allowed individual Indian owners of trust land
to execute a mortgage or deed of trust to such land. All mort-
gages were made subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior." The idea was to encourage individual Indian landholders
to utilize commercial credit to the maximum extent possible, under
the proper supervision of the federal government.7
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), as the federal agency
charged with approving trust mortgages under section 483a, has
regularly exercised this authority. In Montana and the Dakotas
alone, more than 850 thousand acres of trust land had been mort-
gaged by 1986.8 Most of the approved mortgages were taken for
agricultural loans. Today, many of these section 483a-approved
4. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (Mitchell 1). See United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Mitchell II).
5. The original plan under the General Allotment Act was that the allotments be
held in trust for twenty-five years, after which time the Indian owner would receive a
fee patent. However, under section 2 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (25 U.S.C.
§ 462 (1982)), the trust period was extended indefinitely.
6. The text of 25 U.S.C. § 483a (Supp. 1986) states in relevant part:
Mortgages and deeds of trust by individual Indian owners
(a) Foreclosure or sale of land
The individual Indian owners of any land which either is held by the United States
in trust for them or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United
States are authorized, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to execute
a mortgage or deed of trust to such land. Such land shall be subject to foreclosure
or sale pursuant to the terms of such mortgage or deed of trust in accordance with
the laws of the State or Territory in which the land is located. For the purpose of
any foreclosure or sale proceeding the Indian owners shall be regarded as vested
with an unrestricted fee simple title to the land, the United States shall not be a
necessary party to the proceeding, and any conveyance of the land pursuant to the
proceeding shall divest the United States of title to the land. All mortgages and deeds
of trust to such land heretofore approved by the Secretary of the Interior are ratified
and confirmed.
7. 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmI. NEws 2304.
8. K. Fredericks, "Report to American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium on
Financing Indian Agriculture" (1988) (unpublished). Much of the factual and statistical
information in this note is based upon three unpublished reports: "The National Indian
Agricultural Working Group, Final Findings and Recommendations" (December 1987)
[hereinafter NIAWG Final Report]; the Aberdeen Area Credit Task Force, "Recommen-
dations To Aberdeen Area Director" (Aug. 1, 1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report];
and the Fredericks, AIACC Report, supra, authored by Kenneth Fredericks, Sr.
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mortgages are in default. As a result, affected Indian farmers are
in danger of losing their land to creditors through foreclosure,
and Indian tribes are facing yet another erosion of their land base.
This paper examines the nature and extent of the federal trust
responsibility in approving mortgages of trust and restricted
allotments. Part I explores the trust responsibilities of the United
States in general in the management and protection of Indian prop-
erty. Part II looks at how these duties apply in the process of
approving mortgages under section 483a. Finally, part III examines
some possible remedial measures, both judicial and nonjudicial,
available to the Indian farmer facing potential foreclosure of trust
land.
I. The Federal Trust Responsibility in General
Establishing the Fiduciary Relationship
It has long been established that the United States owes general
trust responsibilities in its dealings with Indian people, 9 but the
extent of these responsibilities is unclear. The existence of the
general trust responsibility does not necessarily imply full-fledged
fiduciary duties.' 0 For purposes of establishing this complete trust,
something more than the existence of the common law general
trust relationship is required. The United States Court of Claims
has gone so far as to say that in order for there to be a complete
trust relationship, there must be a clear or strong showing that
Congress intended to create such fiduciary duties."
The notion of the Indian trust doctrine evolved judicially, hav-
ing its origin in two United States Supreme Court cases written
by Chief Justice Marshall, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia2 and
9. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Choctaw
Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S.
432 (1926); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935); Shoshone Tribe v. United
States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); United
States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Mitchell
v. United States, 363 U.S. 206 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); Montana Bank
of Circle v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 601, 613 (1985); Fort Belknap Indian Community
v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 871, 873-74 (1982).
11. Montana Bank of Circle v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 601, 613 (1985).
12. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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Worcester v. Georgia,3 in 1831 and 1832, respectively. Since that
time, the law of the Indian trust doctrine has had an inconsistent
and somewhat unstable development. The exact history of this
development is beyond the scope of this paper since the real pur-
pose is to examine the trust doctrine as it exists today in connec-
tion with the federal government's duties in approving the trust
land mortgages.' 4
The discussion will assume the existence of the so-called general
trust relationship at the outset. The general trust responsibility
essentially encompasses a general duty of fairness and protection.
It arises out of the special relationship between the United States
and the various Indian tribes, a relationship similar to that of
a guardian to his ward.' I The general trust responsibility has long
dominated the United States' dealings with Indian people, and
its existence is undisputed.' 6 Of more importance is an examina-
tion of those duties as they are established in a complete trust
with fully accountable fiduciary obligations. Thus, an inquiry into
the requirements of establishing this stricter trust relationship is
in order.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the trust
doctrine in United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 11).'" Mitchell H
involved alleged breaches of trust in connection with the BIA's
management of forest resources on allotted lands of the Quinault
Indian Reservation in Washington state. The plaintiffs were various
individuals who owned interests in the allotments on the reserva-
tion and who were suing for monetary damages under the Tucker
Act.' The case was before the Court for the second time. In
Mitchell I," the plaintiff allottees had asserted that the United
States had a fiduciary obligation under the General Allotment Act
to manage the timber resources on the allotments and was sub-
ject to monetary damages under the Tucker Act for failure to
do so. As previously stated, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14. An examination of the history and development of the trust doctrine may be
found in Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility, 27 STAN.
L. R.Ev. 1213 (1975).
15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
16. Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741, 750 (10th Cir. 1987); Gila
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 660, 677 (1986).
17. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1948).




ment and held the General Allotment Act created only a limited
trust relationship between the United States and the allottees, which
did not of itself impose a fiduciary duty on the United States to
manage timber resources on allotted lands. Rather, this limited
trust was only for the purpose of preventing improvident aliena-
tion and assuring immunity from state taxation.2" However,
Mitchell I left open the question whether the plaintiff allottees
could recover under some source other than the General Allot-
ment Act.2'
On remand, the United States Court of Claims took the Supreme
Court's lead and held that the plaintiffs could assert a cause of
action under the Tucker Act based on various federal statutes in-
volving timber management, road building and rights-of-way, In-
dian funds management and government fees, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder.22 The court further held that these statutes
and regulations gave the federal government full authority to
manage the Indian property and land, and thereby created a
fiduciary duty on the part of the United States in carrying out
such management functions.23
The Supreme Court affirmed in Mitchell II, noting that the
timber management statutes relied on by the lower court established
comprehensive responsibilities on the part of the federal government
in managing the harvesting of Indian timber, with the BIA exer-
cising literally daily supervision over the harvesting and manage-
ment process.24 The Court held that where such a relationship
exists, a fiduciary obligation necessarily arises since "[a]ll of the
necessary elements of a common law trust are present: a trustee
(the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees) and a trust
corpus (Indian timber lands and funds)." 2 The Court went on
to state that
Where the Federal Government takes on or has control or super-
vision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relation-
ship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties
... even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing
20. Id. at 542-45. See supra text accompanying note 4.
21. 445 U.S. at 546.
22. 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 466 (1982).
23. Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 267-68 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
24. 463 U.S. 206, 222-25 (1983).
25. Id. at 225. See RESTATELENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 2, comment h, (1959).
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or underlying statute (or other fundamental document) about
a ... trust or fiduciary connection.26
Mitchell I and Mitchell I1 can be read as establishing two sepa-
rate principles under which a full fiduciary relationship may be
established between the United States and individual Indian owners
of trust allotments. First, an express trust may be created by the
terms of a treaty, statute, executive order, or other operative docu-
ment. 27 Second, the existence of the fiduciary relationship may
be implied from the federal government's supervision or control
over Indian property.28 One court has indicated that the establish-
ment of a full trust by implication, from control over Indian pro-
perty, is a principle peculiar to Indian tribes, and is "a narrow
exception ... to the requirement that the government must ex-
pressly state its intent to manage the would-be beneficiaries' pro-
perty as a trustee.' '29 The notion that a fiduciary relationship bet-
ween the United States and Indian tribes can arise by implication
is an outgrowth of the general trust responsibility that the United
States owes to Indian tribes, which properly recognizes the long
history of federal control over Indian property. At a minimum,
the fiduciary duty that arises from control over Indian property
encompasses the solemn duty to protect the property from im-
provident alienation.
Where such congressionally authorized control over Indian prop-
erty is established, a fiduciary relationship exists with respect to
that property, even though nothing is said expressly in the underly-
ing or authorizing statute about a trust or fiduciary connection.3"
26. 463 U.S. at 225 (approving Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct.
Cl. 171, 183 (1980)).
27. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 222-25. See also Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (Indian mineral-leasing statutes and regulations established fiduciary rela-
tionship); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Barlow, 834 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1987)
(1916 Act giving Secretary authority to manage Indian forest in a way beneficial to Red
Lake Band established fiduciary relationship); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of
Oil & Gas Conserv., 792 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1986) (Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1838
establishes fiduciary relationship); Navajo Nation v. Hodel, 645 F. Supp. 825 (D. Ariz.
1986) (Indian Child Welfare Act and Snyder Act creates fiduciary relationship); Ute In-
dian Tribe v. Hodel, 673 F. Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1987) (congressionally established judg-
ment fund established fiduciary relationship).
28. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. See also Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Com-
munity v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 660, 676-77 (1986); Navajo Tribe v. United States,
9 Ct. Cl. 336, 344 (1986).
29. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 244 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1986).




This proposition is consistent with the notion that no particular
words or phrases are critical to the finding of a trust relationship
when it is otherwise clear that Congress intended a trust relation-
ship to exist.31 In other words, that Congress chooses to retain
control and supervision over tribal property is an indication of
its intention to maintain a trust relationship with respect to such
property. This is particularly true where the property is the land
base itself, as opposed to, for example, the timber resources ap-
purtenant to the land, as was the case in Mitchell. Protection of
the Indian land base is an area where the trust responsibility has
its greatest force.3 2 Any abdication of that responsibility should
not be lightly inferred.
The two principles introduced above will be elaborated on and
applied more fully in connection with the discussion in part II,
concerning the establishment of fiduciary duties in approving mort-
gages of trust land. Before turning to that issue, however, it is
necessary to examine the standards under which the federal trustees'
actions are measured.
The Standard of Conduct
Once the complete trust relationship is established, a further
inquiry must be made into the standard of conduct to which the
United States trustee will be held in its dealings with the Indian
people. In general, where the United States has charged itself with
trust responsibilities, its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those
who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should be judged
by the most exacting fiduciary standards.33 This strict standard
is applicable in judging the conduct of the federal government
in transactions concerning Indian land.34 In such cases, the United
on Maricopa-Ak Chin Res. v. United States, 667 F.2d 980 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Navajo Tribe
v. United States, 624 F.2d 981 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
31. Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332, (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1078 (1980).
32. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1953); Aguilar v. United States, 474 F. Supp.
840 (D. Alaska 1979).
33. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942); Nance v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981); Coast Indian Community v. United
States, 550 F.2d 639 (Ct. CI. 1977); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D.
Cal. 1973); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
34. Coast Indian Community v. United States, 550 F.2d 639, 652 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. C1. 1966); Aguilar v. United States,
474 F. Supp. 840 (D.C. Alaska 1979).
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States has an obligation to safeguard the property of the Indians
in dealings with third parties, and an even greater duty exists where
the United States itself has an independent interest in the transac-
tions.1
5
Thus, where the trust relationship is established, the standard
of conduct by which actions of the United States on behalf of
Indian people will be judged is not mere reasonableness but is
of the highest fiduciary standard.36 Consequently, in judging the
corduct of federal officials taken pursuant to their trust respon-
sibility, courts should apply the same trust principles that govern
the conduct of private fiduciaries. 37 In reviewing the actions of
the federal trustee, one can look to the general law of trusts in
determining whether the federal trustee has complied with its
obligations38
On the other hand, the Court of Claims seems to take a more
restricted position. In Navajo Tribe v. United States,39 the Court
of Claims stated that the federal trust obligations are not necessarily
coterminous with those of a private fiduciary.4" This position clearly
seems wrong. The only instance where private fiduciary rules should
not apply are those in which the full trust has not been established,
as was the case in Mitchell I. But where the full fiduciary rela-
tionship is established, either implicitly, through control or super-
vision over Indian property, or expressly, by treaty, statute, or
otherwise, there is no reason not to look to the law of private
fiduciaries to judge the conduct of the federal trustee. To the con-
trary, where the full fiduciary relationship is established, the federal
trustee is always governed by the "most exacting fiduciary stan-
dards."'I
Although Navajo Tribe appeared to reject the law of private
fiduciaries in all contexts to judge the conduct of the federal trustee,
the court in reality seemed not so much concerned with the ap-
plicable standard of conduct as with the scope of the federal
trustee's duties. That is, the court's opinion is more consistent
if one were to look at it in the context of analyzing the scope
35. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322-23 (Ct. CI. 1966).
16. American Indians Residing on Maricopa-Ak Chin Res. v. United States, 667 F.2d
980 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
37. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil & Gas Conserv., 792 F.2d 782, 794
(9th Cir. 1986).
38. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 9 Ct. CI. 336, 412 (1986) (citations omitted).
39. Id.
40. Id.




of the federal trustee's duties. In stating that private fiduciary
law is not always applicable in Indian trust cases, the court gave
as an example the rule that the federal trustee does not have a
general duty to maximize income from tribal resources."2 In this
context, the court was, in reality, concerned with the scope of
the trustee's obligations, rather than the proper standard of con-
duct. There can certainly be a problem in establishing the proper
parameters of a trust created by implication. Where the fiduciary
relationship is inferred from control over Indian property alone,
this does not, as the court in Navajo Tribe stated, confer the af-
firmative duty on the federal trustee to maximize income from
tribal land. To find such a duty, one must necessarily look to
applicable statutes, treaties, and other relevant sources. 3
Thus, the duty to make trust property productive, that is, af-
firmative management duties, may not be inferred from control
alone. This is not to say, however, that the duty to manage may
never be inferred from supervision or control over Indian prop-
erty. In essence, the extent of the federal trustee's duties depend
upon the extent of control and supervision it exercises. The more
comprehensive the control, the more comprehensive the duties to
affirmatively manage the property.
Regardless of the affirmative duty to make trust property pro-
ductive, the federal trustee always owes a fiduciary duty, whether
it be express or implied from control over Indian property, to
protect and preserve the trust corpus. The duty to protect trust
property, especially the Indian land base, lies at the very heart
of the Indian trust doctrine."'
In addition, the tendency to look beyond mere control over
property to establish affirmative management duties does not apply
where trust monies are concerned. With respect to trust funds,
the rule appears clear that the United States must undertake af-
firmatively to maximize the trust income.1
5
42. 9 Ct. Cl. at 412 (citing Navajo Tribe v. United States, 222 Ct. Cl. 158 (1979)).
43. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 336, 412 (1986). See
also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, I1 Ct. Cl. 614, 619 (1987) (fiduciary
duty to act affirmatively does not arise independent of linchpin treaty, statute, executive
order, or regulation that charges government with specific duties to act).
44. See supra text accompanying note 32.
45. Ute Indian Tribe v. Hodel, 673 F. Supp. 619, 621 (D.D.C. 1987); Cheyenne
Arapaho Tribe v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390, 1394 (Ct. C1. 1975). See Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians v. Barlow, 834 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir. 1987) (Secretary's duty
to manage funds generated from forest reserve included the duty to actively seek the best
use of the funds).
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The Standard of Care
Having analyzed the standard of conduct and the scope of the
federal trustee's fiduciary duties, it is appropriate also to discuss
the proper standard of care and its various implications. The
Supreme Court discussed the proper standard of care in United
States v. Mason.4" The Court properly made reference to general
principles of the law of private trusts, holding that as a trustee
serving in a fiduciary capacity, the United States is duty bound
to exercise "great care" in administering its trust.47 The Court
ther noted that the trustee is not an insurer of trust property.
Rather, it is under a duty in administering the trust to exercise
"such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exer-
cise in dealing with his own property."48 The prudent person stan-
dard is the generally accepted standard of care in the law of private
fiduciaries.
The degree of care the federal trustee must exercise depends
in part upon the situation of the trust property. Where the ac-
tions of the federal trustee involve potential alienation of the trust
corpus, the degree of care exercised by the federal trustee will
be given stricter scrutiny. 9 On the other hand, the federal trustee
will be given more leniency when it comes to his duties to make
trust property productive. In such cases, the trustee must use
"reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive.'" 0
Holding the federal trustee to a stricter standard in cases in-
volving possible alienation of trust property comports with the
prudent person standard articulated in Mason, supra. It seems
obvious that the man of ordinary prudence, when faced with the
possible destruction or alienation of his property, would exercise
a greater degree of care in making decisions than he would when
faced with ordinary investment alternatives, as, for example, which
alternative yields a higher rate of return. Thus, where the trust
property itself is not in danger of destruction but the only ques-
tion is how to manage it so that it will produce income (assuming
the duty to manage exists), the prudent person may not use as
46. 412 U.S. 391 (1973).
47. Id. at 398 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)).
48. Id. (citing 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS 1408 (3d ed. 1967)).
49. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding
that United States breached its fiduciary duties in allowing termination of Indian rancheria
held in trust).
5C. Manchester Band of Porno Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238,




great a degree of caution in making his decision. In fact, the pru-
dent person may choose riskier alternatives that may turn out to
be more profitable than a safer alternative in the long run.
The point is, the care that a man of ordinary prudence would
exercise in dealing with his own property denotes a certain degree
of caution, skill, and good judgment."1 Prudence is equated with
caution as to danger of risk, as skill and good judgment in the
use of resources. Thus, a prudent person exercising reasonable
care by definition will use that degree of caution, skill, and good
judgment in the use of resources that is equated with the common
definition of prudence.
In addition, while the normal standard of care and skill re-
quired of a trustee is that of a man of ordinary prudence in deal-
ing with his own property, if the particular trustee has a greater
degree of skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he will
be held liable for any loss resulting from the failure to use such
skill as he has.1
2
II. The Federal Trust Responsibility in Approving Mortgages
Under Section 483a
Trust Responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior
Based on the above discussion concerning the establishment of
a fiduciary duty on the part of the federal government in the
management of trust allotments, the question arises as to whether
the federal government, acting through the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs owes strict fiduciary duties in approving mortgages of trust
allotments under section 483a. The answer appears clearly to be
in the affirmative.
First, full fiduciary duties may be established expressly from
the General Allotment Act and section 483a themselves. That is,
under the General Allotment Act, the United States has an ex-
press trust obligation to prevent improvident alienation of the trust
allotments. To the extent one comes within the parameters of this
51. It is generally recognized that caution is implicit in the element of prudence. The
more modern tendency is to emphasize this by stating that the test is not how one would
act with regard to one's own property, but how a prudent trustee would act in administer-
ing the property of others or how a trustee would act in conserving the property. See
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 7-302 (1969). See also E. ScoLEs & E. HAZBACH, JR., PROB-
LEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES AND TRUSTS 592 (3d ed. 1981).
52. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238,
1245 (N.D. Cal. 1973); RESTATEmRNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174, comment at 379 (1959).
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so-called limited trust, full fiduciary responsibilities should be
established. Moreover, the trust duty to prevent improvident aliena-
tion mandated in the General Allotment Act was carried over by
Congress into section 483a. Given the wording in the text of sec-
tion 483a, as well as its legislative history," it is fairly clear that
Congress did not intend that the mortgage approval process be
taken lightly.
Section 483a makes the executed mortgage "subject to approval
by the Secretary of the Interior." 4 It is noteworthy that Con-
gress did not confer absolute discretion on the Secretary in making
his decisions to approve or disapprove the mortgages. This sug-
gests the seriousness with which Congress viewed the approval
process. In those instances where Congress gives the Secretary
discretion in the decision-making process, usually with respect to
management functions, the Secretary's conduct will be judged by
less stringent standards and will generally be upheld unless found
to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." When Congress
wishes to confer discretion on the Secretary, it will generally do
so expressly on the face of the statute. 6 It follows then, that Con-
gress knows how to clothe the Secretary with discretion in discharg-
ing his duties to administer Indian affairs, and where it wishes
to do so, will do so expressly. The fact that Congress did not
coramit the approval of trust mortgages to the discretion of the
Secretary indicates that Congress recognized the possibility of im-
provident alienation of the allotments through subsequent default
and foreclosure. Congress was therefore concerned with taking
appropriate precautions against such alienation by requiring the
Secretary or his delegates to use proper care in making his deci-
sions in order to ensure the protection of the trust property.
The legislative history of section 483a supports this conclusion.
Senate Report No. 1647 emphasizes that the approval of mort-
gages be "under proper supervision." 7 Moreover, the Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, to which the bill was referred,
53. In determining whether legislation preserved a beneficial interest in the Indian
people, courts will examine the face of the act itself, its legislative history, and surround-
ing circumstances. Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
824 (1984).
54. See supra note 6.
55. See, e.g., Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 671 F.2d 383
(10th Cir. 1982).
:56. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 337, 349, 350, 352a, 392, 396d, 396e, 403, 409a, 483 (1982).




was assured by representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
that "proper care" would be exercised in approving mortgages
in order "to prevent improvident loans which would result in the
alienation of Indian lands."
58
It should therefore be apparent from the text and legislative
history of section 483a that Congress fully intended that the trust
responsibility recognized in the General Allotment Act be main-
tained and continued in full force under section 483a. That the
mortgages are subject to the approval of the Secretary, under
proper supervision and care as evidenced in the legislative history,
makes this conclusion seem inescapable.
Moreover, while section 483a provides that for purposes of
foreclosure the land shall be considered held in fee, there is no
evidence that Congress intended to abrogate these trust respon-
sibilities prior to the approval of the mortgages. Any withdrawal
of trust obligations by Congress must be plain and unambiguous
to be effective, 59 and no such intent exists in section 483a.
A federal district court has imposed strict fiduciary duties in
a similar situation where transactions involving Indian land re-
quired the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or his delegated
agent. Coomes v. Adkinson ° was a case concerned with the duties
of the federal government in approving leases of restricted Indian
allotments under section 393 of title 25. Under section 393 the
leases were subject to the approval of the Superintendent of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs or other officers in charge of the reser-
vation, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of the Interior. The plaintiffs in Coomes were challenging a deci-
sion by the BIA to reject the lease bids on six grazing units. The
Coomes court correctly noted that section 393 was concerned with
Indian lands, and that in dealing with such the federal govern-
ment is in a position of trustee and must "maintain sharp focus
on and strict adherence to concomitant fiduciary responsibilities." 6'
The court then noted that the purpose of section 393 was the pro-
tection of Indian lands and the prevention of fraud and unfairness
in leasing those lands.62 Since the Secretary was granted super-
visory power to see that this purpose was effectuated, the court
58. Id.
59. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1975).
60. 414 F. Supp. 975 (D.S.D. 1976).
61. Id. at 986.
62. Id. at 991.
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held that section 393 created a fiduciary relationship that imposed
strict and distinctive obligations of guardianship trust which would
be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.63
The underlying rationale for imposing full trust responsibilities
in Coomes was the fact that the lease transactions required to
be approved by the Secretary involved Indian land. That the
Secretary is required to approve transactions involving the Indian
trust land is entirely consistent with the high fiduciary respon-
sibilities it owes in managing trust land." It is in this situation
that: there exists all the elements of a common law trust. The federal
government (trustee) is making decisions pursuant to a legal obliga-
tion imposed by Congress, with respect to the Indian land (the
trust corpus), in the best interests of the Indian people (the
beneficiaries). 61 Consequently, in this situation the conduct of the
federal trustee should be judged by those fiduciary standards ap-
plicable to common law trustees.
The Coomes case raises a second argument for imposing full
trust responsibilities on the federal government in approving mort-
gages under section 483a. The very fact that the Secretary's deci-
sions under section 483a reflect a certain degree of control and
involve a danger of alienation of the trust land should itself be
sufficient to establish fiduciary responsibilities. By requiring
secretarial approval of the mortgages under section 483a, Con-
gress has granted a certain degree of supervision and control to
the federal government over the affected allotments." The ap-
63. Id.
64. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 365 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Kenai Oil & Gas,
Inc. v. Department of Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521, 534-35 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d
383 (10th Cir. 1982). Cf. Montana Bank of Circle v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 601 (1985)
(federal statute requiring Secretary's approval of any contracts made between any person
and any Indian tribe or individual Indian does not establish full fiduciary duties since
the relationship created thereunder is not comparable in purpose or degree to the control
or supervision of tribal monies or properties that has been found to establish a complete
fiduciary relationship).
65. See supra text accompanying note 25.
66. Presumably, the Department of the Interior would have enacted rules and regula-
tions under which the provisions of section 483a would be carried out, with a view toward
taking proper care to prevent the approval of improvident loans consistent with the con-
gressional mandate. Unfortunately, this writer has been unable to find any such regula-
tions. The only published regulations, at 25 C.F.R. § 152.34, state simply that "[pirior
to approval of such mortgage or deed of trust, the Secretary shall secure appraisal infor-
mation as he deems advisable." It appears that this language is directed only at ensuring
that Ihe value of the allotted land used as collateral is sufficient to secure the loan in
case of default, in order to satisfy creditors. If this is the case, it falls far short of exercis-




proval clause in section 483a reflects the tradition of federal con-
trol over Indian lands, at least up to the point where the mort-
gage is duly approved. 7 As such, the federal trustee has a strict
fiduciary duty to ensure the protection of the land.
Mitchell H recognized that where the federal government assumes
or has control or supervision over tribal property the fiduciary
relationship normally exists with respect to such property (unless
Congress had directed otherwise)." In those situations where the
government is dealing with Indian property, the existence of a
fiduciary relationship can be inferred even though nothing is said
expressly in the underlying statute about a fiduciary relationship.
69
This proposition is attributable to settled doctrine that the United
States, as regards its dealings with the property of the Indians,
acts as a trustee."
The rule that federal supervision and control over trust prop-
erty is of itself sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship has
even more force where the decisions affecting the trust property
involve a risk of alienation. 7  Approval of mortgages of trust
allotments under section 483a clearly involves a real risk of aliena-
tion, one that Congress recognized in considering passage of sec-
tion 483a. Under these circumstances the decisions of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs should be subject to the fiduciary standards of
a private trustee, and in making the decision whether to approve
the mortgage the federal trustee should use great care to ensure
the protection of the trust land.
In sum, there are basically two arguments, either of which
establishes a fiduciary duty upon the Secretary of the Interior in
approving mortgages under section 483a. First, there is an express
trust responsibility under the General Allotment Act and section
483a to prevent improvident alienation of the trust allotments.
67. Northwest South Dakota Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 326 (8th
Cir. 1986).
68. 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
69. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See supra notes
30, 32 and accompanying text.
70. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); American Indians Residing on
Maricopa-Ak Chin Res. v. United States, 667 F.2d 980 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Navajo Tribe v.
United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Oneida Tribe v. United States, 165 Ct.
CI. 487 (1964); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 19 (1944); Aguilar
v. United States, 474 F. Supp. 840 (D. Alaska 1979); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians,
Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
71. See supra text accompanying note 32.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 58.
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Second, notwithstanding the express trust obligations created by
Congress in the two statutes, that the federal trustee is required
to make decisions that touch and concern the trust land is itself
sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship because this amounts
to sufficient control and supervision over trust property to infer
the fiduciary relationship. While the degree of control evidenced
in section 483a may not by itself be comprehensive enough to
establish affirmative management duties, it most certainly imposes
upon the federal trustee the duty to protect and preserve the trust
land. These related propositions should make it indisputable that
the Secretary of Interior owes strict fiduciary duties in approving
mortgages of Indian trust allotments under section 483a.
Trust Responsibilities of the
Farmers Home Administration
Thus far, the discussion has centered around the trust respon-
sibilities of the Secretary of the Interior under section 483a.
However, findings of the Aberdeen Area Credit Task Force and
the National Indian Agricultural Working Group" have raised
an additional issue with respect to another agency of the federal
government, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). Accord-
ing to the Task Force report, as of August 1985, there were in
the Aberdeen area a total of 875 Indian mortgages, encumbering
421,819 trust acres, with a debt burden of more than $40 million.
The FmHA was the lending agency in 610 (70%) of these mort-
gages, involving approximately 248,390 acres, or 58.8% of the
mortgaged trust lands in the area. 74 As of August 1985, the overall
rate of loan delinquency stood at approximately 80%."
By October 1986, 477,703 acres had been mortgaged in the
Aberdeen area, and the debt burden increased to $45.9 million."
The FmHA was by far the biggest lender, holding $27.9 million
in mortgages."
The situation is much the same in the Billings area." As of
October 1986, there were 377,449 acres of individual trust land
under mortgage, with a debt burden of $52.1 million. Again, the
73. See supra note 8.
74. Task Force Report, supra note 8.
75. Aberdeen Area Credit Task Force Minutes of Meeting (Aug. 23, 1985).
76. Fredericks, AIACC Report, supra note 8.
77. Id.
78. The Billings area encompasses all of Indian country in Montana, except the Flathead




FmHA was the largest lender, holding $16.7 million in mortgages. 79
Moreover, as of March 1987, an estimated 145,450 acres of trust
land in Montana and the Dakotas had already been lost or was
in the immediate danger of foreclosure by the FmHA. s°
Thus, to the extent that the FmHA is dealing directly with In-
dian allottees in the loan transactions involving mortgages of trust
lands, the issue arises whether under these circumstances the FmHA
itself, as an agency of the United States, owes trust responsibilities
to the Indian allottees with whom it deals.
Since it is the United States that stands in the trust relation-
ship,"1 it has been held that any federal government action is sub-
ject to the United States' fiduciary responsibilities toward the In-
dian tribes.8 2 Thus, where the United States itself owes fiduciary
obligations, any agent of the United States would be obligated
to carry out the same duties in their dealings with the Indian people.
There is no question that in dealing with Indian people the
FmHA, as an agency of the federal trustee, must keep in mind
and adhere to that special relationship of guardianship-trust (i.e.,
the general trust responsibility) existing between the United States
and Indian people.13 But since recent court decisions have
distinguished between the existence of the general trust and the
establishment of a complete trust relationship with full fiduciary
duties, 4 it is necessary to further determine whether the FmHA
may be held to the fiduciary standards indicative of a complete
trust. This question depends upon whether the United States itself
owes complete fiduciary duties in ensuring the protection of the
trust land base.
Section 483a specifically delegates approval of the trust land
mortgages to the Secretary of the Interior and therefore cannot
be used as a basis for imposing fiduciary duties on the FmHA,
79. Fredericks, AIACC Report, supra note 8.
80. NIAWG Final Report, supra note 8.
81. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
82. Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1981)
(EPA owed fiduciary duties to the Crow Tribe in determining whether approval of a
redesignation of air quality standards on adjacent Northern Cheyenne Reservation from
class II to class I adversely affected Crow Tribe's ability to mine coal). See Ute Indian
Tribe v. State, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1141 n.187A (D. Utah 1981) (actions of the United
States Forest Service in its dealings with Indians are subject to being judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards of the federal trust responsibility.). See also Eric v. Secretary
of Dep't of Housing, 464 F. Supp. 44 (D. Alaska 1978).
83. See supra notes 10, 16, 17, and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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an agency of the Department of Agriculture. However, the fact
that Congress has delegated the trust responsibilities of the United
States to the Secretary of the Interior under section 483a cannot
of itself constitute an abrogation of the federal trust responsibil-
ity as it exists under other sources of law in the absence of ex-
press congressional intent to the contrary." The federal trust
responsibility is primarily administered through the Department
of the Interior and the BIA, s6 but this should not exempt other
agencies of the United States from the federal trust responsibility
as it otherwise exists, to the extent that those agencies are dealing
directly with Indian people and resources.87 Thus, if a strict
fiduciary relationship between the United States and the allottees
cart be established under some source other than section 483a,
the FmHA should be subject to that relationship.
Under the General Allotment Act, it is the United States that
holds the land in trust for the sole use and benefit of the allot-
tees.88 It follows that any agency of the United States coming within
the parameters of the General Allotment Act's limited trust as
set forth in Mitchell I should be subject to strict fiduciary duties
in administering the obligations under the trust.
One of the duties established under this limited trust is the
prevention of improvident alienation. 9 It seems clear that the
FmHA operates under this responsibility in reviewing and approv-
ing Indian loan applications under which trust allotments are mort-
gaged. The FmHA deals directly with the Indian loan applicant,
and the transaction concerns the possible alienation of trust land.
Under these circumstances, given the existence of the General Allot-
ment Act's limited trust, as well as the traditional application of
fiduciary responsibilities where the federal trustee is charged with
protecting trust land,9" it appears clear that the FmHA is subject
to strict fiduciary duties in approving loan transactions which in-
volve mortgaged trust land.
85. See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (lst
Cir. 1975).
86. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). See Ute Indian Tribe v. State,
521 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Utah 1979).
87. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1141 n.187A (D. Utah 1979).
88. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1982).
89. See supra note 4.
90. See, e.g., Begay v. Albers, 721 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1983); Navajo Tribe v. United
States, 364 F.2d 320 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior,
522 F. Supp. 521 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982); Aguilar v. United
States, 474 F. Supp. 840 (D. Alaska 1979); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.




Thus, the FmHA and the BIA, as agents of the federal trustee,
should owe strict fiduciary duties in reviewing and approving mort-
gages of trust land, to the extent both are directly involved in
the transactions.9 Consequently, the FmHA would not be in the
position of a mere creditor in mortgaging Indian lands. Rather,
the FmHA stands in the fiduciary capacity of the federal govern-
ment, and as such must exercise proper care to protect the trust
land in approving the mortgages.92
Fulfilling the Trust Responsibility
Given that the BIA and the FmHA both owe strict fiduciary
duties in reviewing and approving mortgages of trust land, their
regulations should reflect these duties in the loan application and
approval process. In order to adequately gauge these respon-
sibilities, it is appropriate to examine what must be done in order
to fulfill those duties, keeping in mind that the federal trustee
serving in a fiduciary capacity must, under the prudent person
standard, exercise great care to protect with the trust land. 3
It is clear that in determining whether to approve or disapprove
a proposed mortgage, the federal trustee must take all relevant
factors into account. This is so even where the decision is discre-
tionary.94 Given the risk involved, these factors should be con-
sidered with a view toward protecting the trust lands. It follows
91. The FmHA and BIA's situation are analogous to that of co-trustees since each
agency deals directly with the Indian beneficiary on behalf of the United States. As co-
trustees each agency is individually responsible for fulfilling its own fiduciary duties, and
the one may not rely on the other to administer the trust. Where there are several trustees,
each of them is under a duty to participate in the administration of the trust and to use
reasonable care to prevent the co-trustee from committing a breach of trust. In re Mueller's
Trust, 135 N.W.2d 854, 865-66 (Wis. 1965).
92. That the FmHA is acting both as lender and federal trustee in this situation raises
an additional issue of conflict of interest. As a lender, the federal trustee's interests are
potentially adverse to those of the debtor, the Indian beneficiary. Because of this, and
because of the government's special duty toward the Indians, the various mortgage trans-
actions must be carefully scrutinized. Navajo Tribe v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 323
(Ct. Cl. 1966). See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
93. See 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS 1408 (3d ed. 1967). Recall that in part I of this article,
it was argued that a fiduciary is under a greater duty of care when the transaction involves
a risk of alienation of the trust property. In such a case, the prudent person will by defini-
tion exercise greater care because caution as to risk of loss is implicit in the word "prudence."
94. See Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir.
1982) (where the federal trustee was clothed with discretion in the decision-making pro-
cess, standard of review was whether decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse
of discretion and if trustee considered all relevant factors in reaching his decision and
made no clear error of judgment, decision could not be overturned).
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that the decision maker, whether it be the FmHA or the BIA,
should scrutinize each loan application and use a proper degree
of care and caution to prevent the approval of improvident loans
that would result in the subsequent alienation of the trust land.
Loan Repayability. The most important factor that should be
taken into account is repayability. In order to adequately protect
the mortgaged land, there must be a good prospect for repay-
ment of the loan. Several factors are pertinent in this regard. First,
the creditworthiness of the applicant should be determined by ex-
amining prior credit history and credit ratings. The higher the credit
rating, the lower the risk of default and subsequent foreclosure.
Second, there should be a valid farm plan of operation accom-
panying each loan package. The most important factor to be ex-
amined in the plan of operation is profitability. Obviously, if the
enterprise stands little chance of being profitable, there is less
chance of repayment. Profitability is the essence of the opera-
tion, and it would be foolhardy to enter into any commercial enter-
prise without an adequate assessment of the prospects for pro-
fitability. Certainly, the prudent person would not do so.
In order to adequately assess repayability, it is essential to have
a sound knowledge of the agricultural industry. This includes
familiarity with the modem-day version of the industry and know-
ing it well enough to project what is likely to happen in the future."
Keeping informed of the impact of current trends in agriculture
and planning accordingly is a necessary prerequisite in assuring
the viability of the agricultural enterprise.1
6
Thus, for example, BIA employees providing management and
technical assistance to Indian farmers should be aware of the
market cycles associated with agriculture by accessing market
forecasts and information that would enable them to make more
accurate predictions concerning agricultural planning. 7 This
95. SWACKHALER & DOLL, FiNANCING MODERN AGRicmLTuR : BANtKwo PROBLEMS
AN) CHALLENGES (1969) (available in the research department of the Federal Reserve Bank,
Kansas City).
96. Id.
97. According to the Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual, the BIA Division of Credit
and Financing has staff responsibility for all credit and financing matters, including loans
to individual Indians, regardless of the lender. 47 B.I.A.M. § 3.1. The Division of Natural
Resources, Office of Land Operations, is responsible for all technical agricultural mat-
ters. 47 B.I.A.M. § 3.4. Credit officers are responsible for the financial phases, while
the employees of Land Operations are responsible for the planning phases of agricultural
loans. 47 B.I.A.M. § 3.4(A)(3).




knowledge of the industry is an essential requisite in providing
and adequately assessing farm plans. A prudent person certainly
would not be without such knowledge in making decisions con-
cerning his own property, and therefore such knowledge should
be imputed to the federal trustee in reviewing agricultural plans
of operation.
A third factor in determining the prospect of repayability is
a consideration of economic factors affecting risk. For example,
operational expenses in a livestock operation may include winter
feeding, fencing, fuel, maintenance, leases, labor, and living ex-
penses. An adequate projection of these and other operational
expenses for each plan of operation is very important in figuring
profitability and repayability. Obviously, any underestimation of
operation expenses would create an illusion of increased profit
margins. The practical result is that ten years into the operation
the actual expenses may have cut so far into income as to reduce
or eliminate profitability and thereby increase the risk of default
on the loan. In order to prevent this, the federal trustee reviewing
the loan package should ensure that a realistic projection of opera-
tional expenses has been provided. This would further ensure the
integrity and viability of the operation, thereby further providing
for the safety of the mortgaged trust land.
Related to the accurate projection of operational expenses in
assessing economic factors related to risk is the price of particular
agricultural goods produced and sold. In order to realistically
predict prices at which goods will be sold, and to determine which
type of goods will be more productive, the federal trustee must
necessarily be aware of factors such as market trends, current
prices, and existing volume, i.e., supply of particular types of
agricultural goods.
For example, assume a loan application under which trust lands
will be mortgaged is submitted in April and the proposed plan
of operation will use loan proceeds to immediately purchase 300
head of yearling cattle. The plan further provides that the year-
technical assistance in the area of agribusiness. It would seem that in order to fulfill their
fiduciary duties in approving mortgages of trust land, the majority of which are taken
for agricultural loans, these officers and employees would have to be sufficiently
knowledgeable to be able to meet the prudent person standard of care in managing the
trust property. Ideally, this means that the person in charge of planning should either
be well experienced in agriculture or have a college degree in agribusiness. At least, the
law will imply sufficient knowledge and ability on the part of the fiduciary to enable
him to make the decisions of a prudent person, regardless of any real limitations. See
In re Mild's Estate, 136 A.2d 875 (N.J. 1957). The standard of care is strictly objective.
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lings will be fattened on grass over the summer and sold in the
fall. The proceeds, after payment of expenses including a pay-
ment on the loan will go to the purchase of more yearlings the
next spring, again to be fattened for sale, and so on from year
to year. However, the current price of yearlings is abnormally
high due to increased market (buying) activity over the past three
months in yearling cattle. Additionally, market experts have
predicted that by fall the price of yearlings will be down substan-
tially due to a glut on the market and that it will take at least
five years for the yearling cattle market to recover to its current
condition.
The federal trustee reviewing such a plan should plug these
market factors into the plan of operation in ascertaining prospects
of profitability and repayability. Undoubtedly the operator is in
trouble at the outset and will take a loss under these circumstances.
The result will likely be nonpayment on the loan and default, thus
placing the mortgaged trust land in danger of alienation through
foreclosure. Given the risk involved in such a venture, the pru-
dent federal trustee should turn the loan down in favor of protect-
ing the trust land, or at least amend the plan of operation to in-
clude production of a more profitable good.
A fourth factor that should be considered in determining
repayability is the repayment schedule for the loan. Typically,
agricultural loan payments are made on a yearly basis due to the
nature of production periods. Loan payments amortized over
longer periods of time result in smaller yearly payments that are
easier to meet than those under short amortization periods, which
create higher yearly payments. Thus, an amortization period of
thirty years would be much more favorable than one over ten
years. The effect of longer repayment periods makes it easier for
the debtor to meet yearly payment obligations and has the addi-
tional benefit of neutralizing the exogenous factors of agriculture
(i.e., factors that cannot be controlled, such as cost of goods sold,
price, climatic conditions, etc.) 8 By spreading out the debt burden,
the Indian farmer is better able to absorb the shock of a bad year
or even two or three bad years. Thus, the risk of default is
decreased in those loans amortized over longer periods of time.
It follows that the shorter the amortization schedule, the greater
the risks. The federal trustee in reviewing loan applications under





which trust land will be mortgaged will do well to look for longer
amortization periods where possible."
Questionable Past Practices. The factors discussed above are
just a few of the relevant considerations in determining whether
approving a mortgage of trust land is feasible. It is not yet clear
to what extent an involved federal trustee actually considers these
and other relevant factors in making that decision. However, at
least two serious questions have been raised that if taken as true
would place the fulfillment of the federal trust responsibility in
grave doubt.
In the late 1970s, a large number of loans were made by the
FmHA to Indian farmers under which trust lands were mortgaged
and proceeds used to pay off prior bank (chattel) loans. The Fort
Berthold Land and Livestock Association ' has alleged that these
loans were made under time constraints with very little planning
and management and were amortized over short periods of time
resulting in immediate delinquency. 10' Emergency short-term loans,
hastily reviewed and approved and used to bail out prior obliga-
tions, are definitely not the sort of transaction in which trust lands
should be mortgaged. There is obviously greater risk involved as
a result of the short amortization period (resulting in high annual
payments), as well as the fact that no additional value other than
forgiving a prior debt is received. Moreover, there is an inherent
risk because these were emergency disaster-type loans. Obviously
such loans were not taken under the best of circumstances. It would
seem that allowing trust lands to be taken as security in such a
case would be a flagrant disregard of the federal trustee's obligation
to protect and preserve the trust land.
In addition, several persons have reported that it has been the
practice of the FmHA to approve agricultural loans based only
upon the value of collateral, without consideration of earning
capacity or repayability. 102 It was the FmHA's position that loans
99. The Indian Finance Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543, provides that loans
may be for terms up to thirty years. 25 U.S.C. § 1464. Since land is not depreciable,
real estate mortgages typically run for thirty years. It would seem that any time trust
land is mortgaged, the federal trustee would require this thirty-year amortization schedule
in order to place the risk of default at a minimum.
100. The Fort Berthold Indian Reservation is located in western North Dakota. As
with all the Indian reservations in the Aberdeen area, agriculture is a major economic
enterprise.
101. Fort Berthold Land & Livestock Ass'n, Resolution No. 14-84 (Feb. 14, 1984).
102. This information is based on reports from a meeting at Bismark, North Dakota,
between Indian cattlemen and officials of the BIA and FmHA, held on Mar. 11, 1986.
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based upon earning capacity were too hard to obtain and that
loans based upon adequacy of security were much more liberal
and allowed for larger loans. Notwithstanding the lack of foresight
in such an analysis, if the FmHA approved any loans involving
mortgaged trust lands on this basis, and the BIA did likewise,
such conduct would not even withstand analysis under the ar-
bitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard of review.1"3
Furthermore, it appears to have been the practice of the BIA
to approve trust land mortgages for FmHA loans with little or
no analysis of loan applications. At least in the Aberdeen area,
the BIA does not review or conduct analysis on FmHA loans. '0
The failure of the BIA to conduct any independent review of trust
land mortgages most certainly constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty.10 The BIA has been charged with a most important fiduciary
duty-to protect the Indian land base. In order to ensure adequate
protection, it is imperative that the reviewing officials have a mean-
ingful record before them at the time the decision to approve a
trust land mortgage is rendered. All factors affecting repayability
must be adequately scrutinized to protect the trust lands from im-
provident alienation. Anything less is unacceptable.
Finally, that nearly 80 percent of the trust land mortgages are
currently in a state of delinquency in the Aberdeen area itself in-
dicates a lack of care in approving the mortgages. It is hard to
believe that proper care and caution were used to prevent improvi-
dent alienation of these trust lands when so many are currently
in danger of foreclosure.
III. Remedies Available to Indian Farmers
Facing Foreclosure
It should be clear by now that Indian farmers in danger of
losing their land through foreclosure are not without hope. Serious
issus have been raised concerning the role of the federal trustee
in allowing trust land to be put in such danger of alienation. At
this time, these issues remain unanswered. Yet, it is essential that
the Indian farmer be aware that he is not without rights and that
he does not stand alone in facing this potential disaster.
103. See supra note 82.
104. Letter from Acting Area Director Melvin Rousseau to Senator Kent Conrad (Aug.
31, 1987) (responding to concerns regarding potential loss of trust lands through mort-
gage foreclosure).






Given the magnitude of the problem, the prospect of a class
action on behalf of Indian farmers who have trust lands under
mortgage in the Aberdeen area seems appealing. The theory of
liability would be breach of fiduciary duty by the United States,
acting through the BIA and the FmHA. There are several alter-
natives that may be used to get judicial relief in such cases.
One alternative is a Mitchell 11-type of action asserted in the
United States Court of Claims. In Mitchell II, a claim for monetary
damages for breach of trust was asserted under the Tucker Act.'
By giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specific types of
claims against the United States, the Tucker Act constitutes a
waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to
those claims. 7 However, the Court held in Mitchell 11 that the
Tucker Act does not create any substantive right enforceable against
the United States for monetary damages. A substantive right must
be found in some other source of law, such as "the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive depart-
ment."'0 ° In order for a claim to be cognizable under the Tucker
Act, the claimant must demonstrate that the source of substan-
tive law he relies on can fairly be interpreted as mandating com-
pensation by the federal government for the damage sustained. 9
This test will be satisfied where the claimant can show that the
source of law he is relying on establishes a fiduciary relationship
and defines the contours of the United States' fiduciary respon-
sibilities. This is so because once the trust relationship is established,
106. The Tucker Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 and states in pertinent part:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982).
A counterpart to the Tucker Act is the Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505, which
gives any "tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians" the same access
to the Court of Claims provided to individual claimants under the Tucker Act. Claimants
asserting a Mitchell lI-type action should rely on both these statutes because as a class
they may be considered an identifiable group under the Indian Tucker Act. See Fields
v. United States, 423 F.2d 380 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
107. Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (Mitchell fl).
108. Id. at 216.
109. Id. at 216-17.
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it naturally follows that the government should be liable in damages
for breach of its fiduciary duties."'
The substantive law that could be relied on by the injured In-
dian farmers in this case would be the General Allotment Act,
section 483a, and all applicable rules and regulations thereunder,
as well as other statutes and regulations affecting credit and finance
in Indian agriculture."' As argued in part II of this article, the
General Allotment Act and section 483a established fiduciary duties
upon the government to prevent improvident alienation of allot-
ted trust land. To the extent the claimants come within the
parameter of this so-called limited trust, there should be a fiduciary
relationship established, and therefore the claimants should be able
to assert a claim under the theory of Mitchell II.
There is, however, one problem with such an action in that
the claimants would be suing for monetary damages. As the situa-
tion now stands, most of the trust land under mortgage in the
Aberdeen area has not yet been alienated through foreclosure.
Until it is, the affected Indian farmers arguably would not be
measurably damaged. In order to adequately assess damages, it
appears that the claimants would have to wait until their land
was taken before asserting a Mitchell /!-type claim. It is unlikely
that such a result would be very satisfying since the Indian farmers
are probably looking to retain their land and their way of life
rather than be compensated for its loss." 2
A better alternative for those who still retain their land is to
seek equitable relief whereby the improperly mortgaged trust land
would not be subject to foreclosure actions. The best course of
action in this regard would be to seek both declaratory and in-
junctive relief. 13 The plaintiffs would seek a declaration that (1)
the United States owes fiduciary duties in approving mortgages
of trust land, and (2) the federal trustee breached those duties
in approving improvident mortgages, thus placing the trust land
in danger of alienation. The plaintiffs would then seek an injunc-
tion against foreclosure on all the affected trust lands.
110. Id. at 224-26.
111. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453 (1982); 25 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-101.25; 47 B.I.A.M.
§ 3.0.
112. On the other hand, it is arguable that damages could be measured by determin-
ing the amount necessary to satisfy the mortgage. This would obviously make the Indian
debtor whole and put him back in the position he would have occupied but for the ap-
proval of the improvident loan.
113. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Pyramid




Jurisdiction in federal district court would be predicated on sec-
tion 1331 as a federal question," 4 on the Declaratory Judgment
Act,11 and on the Administrative Procedure Act."16 The scope
of the United States' fiduciary duty in administering the trust prop-
erty is considered a question of federal law and thus jurisdiction
would lie under section 1331.17 Further, under the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, the district
court would have the authority to determine the legal relation-
ships and review the actions of the BIA and FmHA in approving
mortgages of trust land," 8 and to set them aside if found to be
unlawful.
An equitable remedy of this or a similar type seems more at-
tractive than a damages remedy under the Tucker Act. There is
clearly more benefit in a remedy that would allow the Indian
farmers to keep their most precious resource, their land base. The
effect of the injunction would be to remove the cloud over the
title to the land and allow the agribusinessmen to focus their ef-
forts on starting anew, free from the constant threat that they
may be put out of business at any time.
Nonjudicial Alternatives
Obviously, if the federal government and the Indian farmers
could come to a mutual agreement aimed at rescuing the en-
dangered trust lands, there would be no need to seek legal redress.
The question is whether the federal government is willing to
recognize the magnitude of the problem and take appropriate ac-
tion in order to properly fulfill its trust responsibility, which has
already been placed in doubt.
The federal government has become aware of the problem. A
fact-finding forum on Indian agriculture was conducted at the
Fort Berthold Reservation by the Senate Agriculture Committee,
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
115. Id. § 2201.
116. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
117. United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973). See National Farmers Union Ins.
Co's. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
In addition, the federal statutes under which the fiduciary duty is established would
also provide federal question jurisdiction.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. 1985); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See Goodface v. Grassrope,
708 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1983) (district court had jurisdiction to review action taken by
the BIA in refusing to recognize either a tribal council whose members were elected in
1980 or a council elected in 1982).
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chaired by Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota."9 At that
forum, Senator Conrad expressed concern over the apparent lack
of meaningful reviews of trust land mortgages by the BIA.'2"
The Aberdeen Area Credit Task Force and the National In-
dian Agricultural Working Group have also studied the problem
and have come up with a number of proposed solutions. As an
immediate solution, the Task Force recommends that the BIA,
working in conjunction with the FmHA and other lenders, develop
and implement a program that provides for restructuring of prob-
lem loans with a set-aside of funding for cash flow operations.' 2'
This plan would require a transfer of funds from the FmHA to
the BIA under which the BIA would, pursuant to the Indian Finan-
cing Act, 22 pay out existing loans based on fair market value of
collateral and loan additional dollars to generate more cash flow
for continued farm operations.' 23 The Task Force also recommended
that the BIA work with lenders in refinancing current debt through
re-amortization of loan agreements, including discounting loans
without penalty or interest. 24 The intention of this proposal is
to revitalize agricultural operations and try to salvage and make
productive that which otherwise would be lost. Such a plan seems
reasonable, but whether the BIA will go along with it remains
to be seen. However, with respect to trust land mortgages, it would
seem that the BIA would be more than willing to accommodate
this ; plan, if for no other reason than to avoid the expense and
possible liability of the lawsuit that will almost certainly be brought
in an attempt to save the trust lands.
In addition, the Task Force recommended development of a
program to educate Indian agribusinessmen on the effective use
of credit, including the development of an intense training pro-
gram for Agency credit personnel in agricultural and related
business that would give the credit personnel the expertise they
need in financing Indian agriculture.' Here the Task Force is
merely asking the BIA to do what it is responsible for in the first
119. Senate Comm. on Agriculture, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Fact Finding Forum on
Indian Agriculture (Sept. 1, 1987) (Before Honorable Kent Conrad, United States Senator,
at New Town, North Dakota).
120. Id., transcripts at 71-76.
121. Task Force Report, supra note 8, at 3.
122. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1453 (1982).






instance, that is, to be sufficiently knowledgeable in the business
of agriculture to be able to make the sound decisions of a pru-
dent person and thereby carry out its trust responsibilities.
Knowledge of the industry is not merely a goal; it is an essential
requirement in fulfilling the trust responsibility with respect to
the financing of Indian agriculture. Given the fact that agriculture
plays such an important role in so much of Indian country, it
seems incomprehensible that the BIA as federal trustee would
employ personnel with so little knowledge and experience in
agribusiness at these crucial positions. If it does turn out that these
key personnel were without sufficient knowledge and feel for
agriculture, it will be the federal trustee and not the Indian
beneficiary who suffers. The federal trustee is, as a fiduciary, held
to a prudent person standard, and such knowledge of agribusiness
will be imputed, regardless of any actual deficiencies. 26
The National Indian Agricultural Working Group has made
similar recommendations.1 27 The Working Group has further
recommended that the BIA and the FmHA work together to find
solutions to prevent the potential erosion of the Indian land base. 12
More important, the Working Group recommends that the
FmHA's trust responsibility be clarified and that its policies and
procedures be reviewed to ensure adequate protection of trust
resources in those cases where FmHA acts as the lender for In-
dian agriculture and loans." 9 The same should be done within
the regulatory scheme of the BIA.
In the final analysis, the federal trustee still has a chance to
cure what may well be a serious breach of trust. It is undisputed
that many Indian trust lands "are in danger of foreclosure, present-
ing a serious threat to reservation economies and their trust land
base."' 30 Serious allegations have been made with respect to the
circumstances under which these trust mortgages were executed.
Undoubtedly, Indian agribusinessmen will not remain passive and
watch their lands disappear. If nothing else, this article has raised
the issues upon which the battle lines will be drawn. It is hoped
that the precious land base of the Indian people will be preserved,
and the tragic history of the many federal Indian land takings
will not be repeated.
126. See supra text accompanying note 85.
127. NIAWG Final Report, supra note 8, at 43-44.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 48-49.
130. Id. at 48.
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Conclusion
The United States has charged itself with solemn trust respon-
sibilities in protecting and preserving the Indian land retained in
trust. Although the General Allotment Act attempted to extinguish
traditional tribal property concepts, the federal trust responsibil-
ity to individual Indian owners to protect the land from improvi-
dent alienation remains. The mortgaging of trust lands undoubtedly
involves a risk of alienation, and the federal trustee reviewing and
approving such mortgages must closely evaluate each plan of opera-
tion with a view toward protection of the trust property. In order
to adequately carry out his fudiciary duties in this regard, the
federal trustee as a prudent person must have a sound knowledge
of the agricultural industry and must exercise proper caution in
evaluating the risks involved.
The extent to which the federal trustee has fulfilled his fiduciary
obligations in approving mortgages of trust land is an issue yet
unresolved. However, given the circumstances under which some
of these mortgages were executed, and their status today, grave
doubts have arisen. Indian agribusinessmen do not stand alone
in their struggle to preserve their way of life. The federal trustee
must be held accountable and should now make every effort to
salvage those mortgaged trust lands which face the real and im-
mediate danger of being lost forever. To the extent that the federal
trustee has failed to fulfill his fiduciary obligation to protect and
preserve the trust land, the Indian beneficiary should not be made
to suffer the consequences. The goal is preservation, and every
effort should be made and every remedy sought to achieve it. After
all, the land is sacred.
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